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Abstract 
 
Family is special. People avoid sexual contact with close relatives, but at the same time are 
highly beneficent toward them. Such discriminatory behavior is guided by a set of psychological 
mechanisms, heuristics that facilitate evolutionarily adaptive behavior most of the time but may 
lead to over-perception of kinship under specific circumstances. In this chapter, we describe 
psychological mechanisms of kin recognition in sexual and altruistic contexts, and we discuss the 
extent to which these mechanisms may influence close relationships between unrelated 
individuals, resulting in an experience of “psychological kinship.” We suggest that friendship 
may provide a context within which over-inclusive kin recognition is especially likely to occur, 
especially among women. We also identify questions for future research, including when men 
might be especially prone to over-perceiving kinship. 
 
Keywords: altruism; family; friendship; incest avoidance; kin recognition; kinship 
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<h1>Introduction 
 
 In the American television series Friends (Crane et al., 1994–2004), the characters Joey 
and Rachel become infatuated with each other and attempt a romantic relationship after having 
been close friends for several years. Previously, two other characters – Chandler and Monica – 
had successfully gone from being friends to lovers. In the (anti)climactic episode (Buckner & 
Halvorson, 2003), Joey and Rachel reach the brink of sexual contact, only to hit a psychological 
wall: They find that the situation feels “weird” and “wrong.” Eventually they give up, 
disappointed and bewildered. Rachel asks, “I wonder how Monica and Chandler could do it?” 
Joey answers, “I guess they weren’t as good friends as we are.” The reasoning is not articulated; 
presumably, viewers understand why being such good friends should pose a problem. An earlier 
episode (Reich, Cohen, & Weiss, 2002) provides a hint: The character Ross, having difficulty 
picturing Joey and Rachel as a couple, says to his sister Monica, “I mean it’s... It’s like you and 
me going out, only weirder!” Perhaps what Joey and Rachel felt was a tinge (or more) of what a 
typical brother and sister would feel upon contemplating sex with each other. 
 To make interesting scientific discoveries, one must ask the right questions. A major 
benefit of adopting a functional–evolutionary perspective in psychology is that we are forced to 
go beyond the obvious, to pose what may at first seem like “dumb” questions. Why do we like 
the sight of beautiful faces? Why do we get upset when rejected by others? Why do we relish 
social acceptance? It is tempting to answer: We just do. Of course, when something just feels 
obvious, it is usually because the messy psychological details are enwrapped within human 
intuition and introspectively unavailable (James, 1890). As psychologists, these details are part of 
what we are trying to uncover; but being humans, our intuition often prevents us from 
recognizing the right questions in the first place (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994). A common 
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consequence is that there exist conspicuously under-explored patches of psychological terrain, 
especially (and ironically) in intuition-rich areas requiring particular research attention. 
 Within social psychology – the field that deals with people’s thoughts about and relations 
with other people – kinship represents one of those under-explored patches (Daly, Salmon, & 
Wilson, 1997). Despite the fact that thoughts about and relations with kin dominate social life, 
the social psychological literature has surprisingly little to say about kinship. A search of the 
database PsycINFO (in September, 2009) returned a total of 8711 articles in the leading empirical 
journal, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP), going back to the year 1965. A 
search for articles containing the words “kin” or “kinship” in the title returned 2 articles (0.02% 
of the total). A search for titles containing the words “family” or “families” was more 
encouraging, turning up 38 additional articles (0.44% of the total), although only a handful of 
these were about family relations per se. These numbers don’t tell the whole story, of course, but 
perhaps the low profile of kinship is not surprising, given how fundamental it is. People have 
deep intuitions regarding kinship (Jones, 2003; Lieberman, Oum, & Kurzban, 2008), and social 
psychologists – being people – may not have felt the need to probe those intuitions. Consider the 
following questions: Why do parents favor their own children over others? Why don’t brothers 
and sisters have sex with each other? How do people know who their children, brothers, and 
sisters are? It is easy to dismiss such fundamental questions because they seem trivial: of course, 
parents favor their own children; of course, siblings don’t have sex; and we just know who our 
family members are. 
 In this chapter, we contemplate some of these questions and describe some of the 
psychological mechanisms underlying kin relations as revealed by empirical research. The 
emerging picture is not as clear-cut as one might think. For starters, the mind must rely on fairly 
simple – and fallible – heuristics to reckon genetic relatedness, and this may sometimes have 
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some odd downstream repercussions, as Joey and Rachel discovered. And although Joey and 
Rachel’s feelings of unease appeared to be mutual, there are reasons to suspect that women may 
find the prospect of sex with close friends particularly aversive (in fact, it was Rachel who 
initiated the awkwardness by “unconsciously” slapping Joey’s hand mid-courtship). As we 
describe below, women may be more likely to treat friends as though they were kin in a variety of 
nonsexual social contexts. We also explore whether there may be circumstances under which 
men may be especially likely to share kinship sentiments with others. 
 As there already exist clear descriptions of how humans detect different classes of actual 
genetic kin (e.g., Lieberman, 2007; Tal & Lieberman, 2007), the bulk of this chapter focuses on 
the extent to which these and associated mechanisms may extend to close relationships between 
nonkin (e.g., Ackerman, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2007; Park, Schaller, & Van Vugt, 2008). In 
particular, we explore the extent to which our understanding of friendship (between nonkin) may 
be illuminated by considering the psychology of kin relations. Ultimately, whether – and how 
powerfully – kinship psychology influences nonkin relations is an empirical matter. The answer 
is not straightforward because, although humans likely possess domain-specific relationship 
schemas, these are unlikely to be encapsulated and mutually exclusive (Barrett & Kurzban, 
2006). Joey and Rachel, despite knowledge that they are unrelated, may have run into trouble 
because of a spillover effect of their incest-avoidance mechanisms. 
 
<h1>Evolution and the psychology of kin relations 
 
 We first present a brief review of the psychological mechanisms underlying identification 
of kin within the contexts of sexual relations and helping behavior. Along the way, we attempt to 
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clarify some issues, especially some common misunderstandings of the psychological 
implications of a biological perspective on kinship. 
 
<h2>Incest avoidance and the role of familiarity 
 
 People tend not to engage in sexual relations with biological relatives. This is not because 
individuals curb incestuous urges; most people find the mere thought of sex with close relatives 
emotionally disturbing (e.g., Park, 2008). This fact may seem self-evident, and it represents one 
of the many unexamined intuitions described above. Indeed, there are theoretical reasons to 
expect people to find family members especially desirable. Repeated in many social psychology 
textbooks is the notion that similarity and familiarity are among the key contributors to attraction 
(e.g., Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2005; Brehm, Kassin, & Fein, 2005) – and who is more similar 
and familiar to us than our genetically related family members? Families also tend to support 
each other, and we like people who are kind to us (Li, Bailey, Kenrick, & Linsenmeier, 2002). 
So, why aren’t we interested in jumping into bed with our parents and siblings? 
 Westermarck (1891) was one of the first scholars to recognize the significance of incest-
avoidance tendencies. In fact, he proposed one of the earliest evolutionary psychological 
hypotheses: that humans are innately predisposed to find incest aversive and that early-life 
coresidence – which most often occurs among close kin – is what inspires the aversion. (Animals 
are expected to evolve incest-avoidance tendencies, due to the harmful consequences of 
inbreeding; see Lieberman, 2007.) 
 From the perspective of contemporary psychology, Westermarck’s (1891) key insight was 
not that humans are innately incest avoidant (although this idea was also significant, especially in 
the Freudian era), but that natural selection produces information-processing psychological 
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mechanisms designed to take input from the developmental context and produce some functional 
output that drives adaptive behavior. Although he did not use this terminology, he essentially 
made a distinction between ultimate and proximate explanations: that sexual aversion emerges 
between family members is a proximate account of behavior; that this serves the function of 
inbreeding avoidance is the ultimate explanation of the proximate process. Hence, it is not the 
case that humans have evolved motivations to avoid inbreeding per se; rather, humans – and 
many other organisms – have evolved simple heuristics that appear to be directed toward the goal 
of inbreeding avoidance, under most circumstances. But not under all circumstances; in fact, the 
presence of sexual aversion between unrelated people has served as key evidence for 
Westermarck’s hypothesis (e.g., Wolf, 1966). 
 One critical developmental variable that feeds into the incest-avoidance mechanism seems 
to be the number of years one has coresided with another person (e.g., Lieberman, Tooby, & 
Cosmides, 2003). Longer periods of coresidence produce stronger sexual aversions. A large-scale 
study of arranged marriages in China showed that those arrangements in which infants are 
adopted into families and reared with their future mates are marked by lower birth rates and 
higher rates of adultery and divorce than other forms of marriage (Wolf, 1995). Thus it is not 
simply biological kin who can develop incest aversion, but unrelated people as well. Lieberman, 
Tooby, and Cosmides (2007) recently argued that duration of coresidence may be less important 
when more reliable information is available. Specifically, older siblings can observe the arrival of 
their younger siblings and can observe their mother caring for them. Lieberman et al. (2007) 
found that for such older siblings, aversion to incest is elevated regardless of coresidence 
duration; for younger siblings, who cannot observe their older siblings perinatally, coresidence 
duration is the best available cue and does reliably predict aversion to incest (see also Lieberman, 
2009). Either way, it is a sense of familiarity that fuels sexual aversion (we should note that we 
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use the term familiarity to refer to felt closeness such as that typically experienced among family 
members, not to refer to simple knowledge of another person). 
 The role of familiarity as a sexual barrier is also apparent when genetically related 
individuals sometimes do engage in incestuous behavior. The fictional world has no shortage of 
stories of incest, and in many of these there is a lack of normal familial association between the 
relevant individuals (Oedipus and Jocasta being the most famous). This is no coincidence. Even 
if two people are fully aware of their relatedness, without the appropriate level of familiarity they 
may not experience the normal aversion. Empirical research supports this conjecture. One set of 
studies found that (nonfictional) genetic siblings who engage in procreative incest (as opposed to 
non-procreative incest) are more likely to have spent time apart during their childhood (Bevc & 
Silverman, 1993, 2000; according to these researchers, the incest-avoidance mechanism may 
have evolved to be highly domain specific, deterring not just sexual feelings in general, but 
reproductive attempts more specifically). Even in the rare situations in which familiar genetic 
siblings end up committing incest, their familiarity is at the very least a nuisance. In Eugenides’s 
(2002) novel Middlesex, Desdemona and Lefty (sister and brother who grew up with each other) 
develop romantic feelings and get married incognito: “Their honeymoon proceeded in reverse. 
Instead of getting to know each other, becoming familiar with likes and dislikes, ticklish spots, 
pet peeves, Desdemona and Lefty tried to defamiliarize themselves with each other” (pp. 71–72, 
emphasis added). 
 Westermarck’s (1891) hypothesis also implied something that we normally take for 
granted – that people are capable of identifying and remembering specific individuals across 
extended periods. Familiarity with a specific person implies forming a representation of that 
person as an abstraction, which persists even as tangible features of the person (facial features, 
vocal qualities) change over time. This means that psychological processes underlying familiarity 
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are likely to be distinct from processes typically studied by social cognition researchers, which 
mostly have to do with how individuals react to strangers under varying circumstances. Often 
within experimental settings, participants are presented with descriptions or photos of strangers, 
some key variables (e.g., gender, ethnicity, attractiveness) are manipulated, and some 
theoretically relevant responses are assessed. However, it is not feasible to experimentally 
manipulate long-term familiarity in order to assess its effects. Simply put, familiarity is not a 
“cue” in the same sense that those experimentally manipulable variables are cues. Rather, 
familiarity is what results when the relationship between two individuals – along with their 
mental representations – has been fundamentally altered as a result of experience. We stress this 
point because it has been common practice to employ the term “cue” to refer to familiarity as 
well as to other potential correlates of kinship – such as facial resemblance – that purportedly 
require no prior acquaintance. This practice may obscure psychologically distinct processes. In 
particular, confusion can arise when processes underlying identification of already-familiar 
individuals (e.g., identifying one’s child via odor cues) are incorrectly described as examples of 
“kin recognition.” (The ability to recognize an existing family member – based on some sensory 
cue – is not an instance of kin recognition because the underlying individual-identification 
mechanism is a domain-general capacity that is useful across social contexts. The same 
mechanism might be employed, for instance, to identify a well-known enemy.) 
 As Harris (2006) put it, humans possess a “people-information acquisition device”: Most 
of us know dozens – or hundreds – of people and have no difficulty telling them apart by the way 
they look and sound. Highly familiar individuals (such as family members) can indeed be 
identified by smell alone (e.g., Porter & Moore, 1981). The ability to individuate and to identify 
familiar persons by sight, sound, and smell are obviously useful components of an incest-
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avoidance mechanism. This ability is important for other reasons as well – namely, determining 
to whom we should direct our altruistic efforts. 
 
<h2>Kin selection and altruism 
 
 Consider the set of people closest to you – those you can rely on when in trouble and 
those you would help without hesitation. Often such people are family members. When it comes 
to investing our valuable resources (e.g., time, money), we are extremely partial, directing much 
of it to close kin. Why is this? And what psychological mechanisms underlie this tendency? Here, 
the conventional biologically informed answer is that individuals are driven to enhance their 
inclusive fitness, which is achieved by “helping those who share your genes”; and Hamilton 
(1964) is cited as the author of that idea. But this is a misunderstanding (for discussions and 
clarifications, see Daly et al., 1997; Dawkins, 1979; Park, 2007). The intuition that “blood is 
thicker than water” is so deeply ingrained that it can seem like a fundamental law of nature; and 
we easily translate “blood” into “genes.” However, genetic similarity per se is irrelevant to 
understanding what actually motivates altruistic behavior. What kin selection theory states is that 
genes underlying specific altruistic tendencies (e.g., being kind to one’s coresidents) can evolve 
under specific circumstances, not that organisms are genetically omniscient and direct their 
altruistic efforts accordingly. Kin selection theory is thus a guide for identifying proximate 
psychological mechanisms (analogous to the proximate coresidence-based mechanism identified 
by Westermarck); it does not constitute a prescriptive rule for behavior. 
 A common error is to treat Hamilton’s (1964) inequality (C < Br) itself as the proximate 
psychological mechanism, a decision rule that should guide behavior (see Park, 2007). 
Consequently, animals are simply presumed to adjust their level of altruism according to degrees 
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of relatedness. For instance, because the degree of relatedness is .5 between siblings and .125 
between cousins, a simplistic prediction is that individuals should be exactly four times more 
helpful to a sibling than a cousin. This is what led to Haldane’s famous response when asked 
whether he would give his life to save a drowning brother: “No, but I would to save two brothers 
or eight cousins” (McElreath & Boyd, 2007, p.82). Hamilton’s theory states only that such a 
tendency can evolve, not that it must or did. Because of this confusion, behavioral deviations 
from Hamilton’s theory – which occur frequently – are sometimes incorrectly interpreted as 
evidence against kin selection theory. 
 Researchers who wish to apply kin selection theory to altruism must therefore tackle some 
important questions: What proximate psychological mechanisms actually evolved?  Did 
evolution produce information-processing mechanisms that are finely attuned to degrees of 
relatedness, such as those between half-siblings, full siblings, and cousins? When we consider the 
empirical evidence, the picture is far from straightforward. Although humans and many 
nonhuman animals do tend to favor more closely related individuals (e.g., Chapais, Savard, & 
Gauthier, 2001; Judge & Hrdy, 1991; Stewart-Williams, 2007; Webster, 2003), evidence of 
sensitivity to precise degrees of relatedness is virtually nonexistent. But this should not be 
surprising, given that kin selection theory is not about the psychology of kin altruism (see Buss, 
2008, p. 232). As with incest avoidance, what seem to have evolved are simple heuristics such as 
“if X grew up with me in the same nest/litter/home, then be responsive when X needs help.” To 
expect organisms to behave strictly according to degrees of relatedness is to conflate the ultimate 
and proximate levels (just as humans do not possess motivations to avoid inbreeding per se, they 
do not possess motivations to be altruistic to genetic kin per se). 
 Empirical research indicates that the principal “kin-recognition” process underlying incest 
avoidance – familiarity with specific individuals – underlies kin altruism as well. Lieberman et al. 
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(2007) found that varying durations of coresidence with specific individuals calibrates altruistic 
tendencies toward those individuals (at least for altruistic tendencies toward older siblings; with 
respect to younger siblings, the experience of observing one’s mother caring for them seems to 
suffice). The primacy of familiarity as a determinant of altruism is true in other primates as well 
(Goodall, 1986; Rendall, 2004). It would thus seem that mechanisms that allow individuals to 
recognize genetic relations without prior acquaintance are likely to play a relatively minor role, at 
least among primates. As Rendall (2004) noted, “mechanisms that actually identify and 
discriminate degrees of genetic relatedness (so-called true kin recognition mechanisms) appear 
rare” (p. 298). Rare, yes; but do they exist? 
 
<h2>“True” kin-recognition mechanisms? 
 
 In the science fiction film Back to the Future (Canton et al., 1985), the protagonist Marty 
McFly travels 30 years into the past, just before his parents (were supposed to) meet each other. 
Marty is soon disturbed to discover that his mother, Lorraine, has become infatuated with him. In 
one memorable scene Lorraine passionately kisses Marty. But she immediately appears confused, 
saying, “This is all wrong. I don’t know what it is, but when I’m kissing you, it’s like I’m kissing 
my brother.” The audience (and Marty, though too stunned to think clearly) knows why she feels 
this way. But the mechanism is not made explicit. How did she know that something wasn’t 
right? Did something about Marty’s phenotype (his appearance, voice, smell) tip off Lorraine’s 
kin-recognition system? 
 If such a thing had really occurred (perhaps under a more realistic scenario of long-lost 
siblings unknowingly going on a date), it would indicate a different sort of kin-recognition 
capacity, one that does not involve extended familiarity with a specific person. There are 
Park and Ackerman 13 
 
evolutionary reasons to expect such a capacity. Although familiarity is an eminently useful 
heuristic, it’s less useful for close kin who do not share a home (e.g., half siblings). Familiarity is 
also a less-than-perfect indicator of relatedness for males with respect to offspring because of the 
problem of paternity uncertainty. If there is a chance that a man’s partner has given birth to a 
child fathered by someone else (and this is common enough in people and other animals), the 
man cannot rely simply on the fact that he knows the child well. He needs more diagnostic 
information. 
 Indeed, there is evidence for what are known as phenotype matching mechanisms: 
Individuals attend to physical and behavioral characteristics that may connote genetic relatedness 
and react on the basis of those characteristics. Some of these mechanisms seem to be built upon 
the familiarity system whereby newly encountered individuals are compared to already-familiar 
kin. For instance, because I am familiar with my brother and his characteristics, if I encounter 
someone – even a stranger – who resembles my brother, this may then trigger kin-relevant 
responses. Thus, comparisons may be made between unfamiliar others and a general kin 
prototype (i.e., an evolved heuristic may be “if someone resembles familiar kin, treat that person 
as kin”). Fostering studies with nonhuman animals have shown that genetically unrelated 
nestmates/littermates may indeed use each other’s features (vocalizations, smells) to serve as the 
standard of comparison when assessing newly encountered individuals (Sharp, McGowan, Wood, 
& Hatchwell, 2005; Yamazaki et al., 1988). Of course, in such cases, the phenotype matching 
mechanisms are no more diagnostic than the familiarity mechanism on which they are based. Are 
there more foolproof phenotype matching mechanisms? Yes: There is evidence for mechanisms 
that allow individuals to assess genetic relatedness more directly by comparing a target’s features 
to their own (known as self-referent phenotype matching; Hauber & Sherman, 2001). 
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 Unlike familiarity, phenotypic resemblance is a cue that can be experimentally introduced 
in the absence of existing relationships, making it amenable to laboratory research. In recent 
years, several studies have investigated the effects of experimentally manipulated facial 
resemblance. The typical procedure is to take a photograph of a participant’s face and to digitally 
combine it with faces of unfamiliar strangers (for a description, see DeBruine, Jones, Little, & 
Perrett, 2008). The result is a person who facially resembles the participant, but not so blatantly 
that the participant consciously notices it. This method has been used to test whether facial 
resemblance exerts effects that one would expect of a kinship cue – that is, dampening sexual 
attraction while heightening altruistic reactions; evidence supports these expectations (e.g., 
DeBruine, 2005). The method has also been used to test whether men are more sensitive than are 
women to self–child facial resemblance, as one might expect given paternity uncertainty; this 
hypothesis has received mixed support (e.g., DeBruine, 2004; Platek, Burch, Panyavin, 
Wasserman, & Gallup, 2002). What may be occurring in these self-morph studies is kin 
prototype-based phenotype matching (rather than self-referent phenotype matching). The reason 
is that ancestral humans would have had far greater exposure to the appearance of their family 
members than to their own (mirrors and cameras being in short supply). Thus, the observed 
effects of self-morphs may be a consequence of the fact that participants’ faces actually resemble 
those of their family members and thus serve as a proxy for their kin-based prototype. Perhaps 
these experimental effects would be even stronger if participants viewed photos of strangers 
manipulated to resemble a close family member. 
 This burgeoning literature indicates that while the picture is far from clear, people do 
respond in what appear to be functional ways to facial resemblance (see also DeBruine, Jones, & 
Perrett, 2005; Platek et al., 2003, 2004). Of course, these phenotype matching mechanisms can 
lead to errors as well, such as when the kin prototype is based on genetically unrelated 
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individuals (e.g., one’s adopted family). More generally, these experiments are set up precisely to 
stimulate kinship-relevant responses in the absence of actual kinship. Thus, to the extent that the 
effects of manipulated facial resemblance actually recruit kin-recognition mechanisms, these 
findings further demonstrate that it is not only possible but fairly easy to elicit kin-relevant 
responses in the absence of actual kinship, even when perceivers are consciously aware that no 
true kinship exists. 
 Assuming that the effects of manipulated resemblance do pertain to kinship, one must ask 
how ecologically relevant such cues are, considering that, as noted above, familiarity seems to do 
much of the “kin-recognition” work. A handful of studies among actual family members have 
shown that resemblance cues do seem to matter. These studies focus on men’s reactions to 
children, again highlighting the importance of paternity uncertainty. Burch and Gallup (2000) 
conducted a study among men convicted of spousal abuse, examining whether these men’s 
beliefs about the resemblance between themselves and their children predicted various outcomes. 
The results showed that perceived resemblance was positively correlated with the quality of the 
men’s relationships with their children, and negatively correlated with the frequency of spousal 
conflicts and the severity of the injuries suffered by their spouses. Another study found that 
men’s perceived resemblance with their children was positively correlated with the level of 
investment in the children, operationalized as the amount of attention, time, and help devoted to 
the children (Apicella & Marlowe, 2004). Importantly, further research has found that actual 
resemblance (not just perceived resemblance) predicts emotional closeness between father and 
child, but not between mother and child (Alvergne, Faurie, & Raymond, 2010). A recent study 
tested men’s and women’s ability to identify their (purportedly biological) children by odor cues, 
and investigated their investment in the children (Dubas, Heijkoop, & van Aken, 2009). The 
results showed that 67.7% of the men and 79.4% of the women could identify their children by 
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smell. More interestingly, men showed a tendency to invest more in children who were 
identifiable by smell; women showed no such bias. Thus, the experimental effects reviewed 
earlier appear indicative of real-life outcomes. 
 Furthermore, although the evidence is preliminary, it appears that other kinds of 
similarities – such as attitudinal similarity – may also serve as kinship cues, at least under some 
circumstances (e.g., Mobbs et al., 2009). Many of us have experienced meeting a person who 
“reminds” us of a family member and thus draws out charitable feelings (or perhaps mild 
aversions, in sexual situations). One study found that people who tend to trust their intuitions tend 
to make stronger implicit associations between an attitudinally similar stranger and “family” 
concepts, but not the broader category of “pleasant” concepts (Park & Schaller, 2005). Social 
psychological studies have shown that people possess rich mental representations of significant 
individuals (e.g., parent, sibling, spouse), and when presented with a novel target who resembles 
a significant individual, information processing of the target is influenced by those existing 
representations (Andersen, Glassman, Chen, & Cole, 1995). For example, after meeting a person 
who reminds me of my brother, I might mistakenly remember that the person likes to watch 
science fiction films because my brother does. 
 Finally, we mentioned earlier that according to conventional social psychological 
wisdom, people are attracted to “similar” (and “familiar”) others. Does this contradict the view 
that familiarity and phenotypic resemblance should reduce attraction? Not at all. As it turns out, 
the social psychological literature on the impact of similarity/familiarity on “attraction” is not 
about sexual attraction, but about liking (see Park et al., 2008). That similarity promotes liking is 
fully consistent with the present perspective: Outside of sexual contexts, information connoting 
kinship is expected to increase affinity. This sort of divergent effect of similarity is consistent 
with other theoretical perspectives as well. Describing his Exotic Becomes Erotic theory, Bem 
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(1996) noted that “similarity may promote friendship, compatibility, and companionate love, but 
it is dissimilarity that sparks erotic/romantic attraction and passionate love” (p. 323). Familiarity 
has similar consequences: Westermarck’s (1891) theory implies that while familiarity may arouse 
compassion, it is novelty that fuels passion. 
 
<h1>Psychology of kin relations beyond the family 
 
 In this section, we explain why the kin-recognition processes described above inevitably 
lead to situations in which nonkin are perceived as kin, and vice versa. As we describe below, the 
tendency to treat nonkin as kin may underlie – at least to some extent – relationships between 
unrelated individuals; moreover, based on evolutionary cost–benefit analysis, it is possible to 
predict who should be especially prone to treating nonkin as kin, and when. 
 
<h2>Over-inclusive kin perception and sex differences 
 
 A key point concerning the kin-recognition systems described above is that although they 
are often effective (people who live with us and look like us are usually kin), they are not 
foolproof. Consider sibling relations. None of the kin-recognition systems seems capable of 
reliably identifying true genetic siblings under all circumstances. Familiarity becomes unreliable 
the moment someone is switched at birth (or, more realistically, is adopted, is brought into a step 
family, or is a half-sibling who grows up in a different household). And it is far from clear 
whether phenotype-matching mechanisms are sensitive enough to make fine distinctions such as 
those between a full sibling, half-sibling, and cousin. Even the self-referent phenotype matching 
process can be activated by a complete stranger who, by sheer coincidence, looks, sounds, smells, 
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and acts like we do. Thus, kin recognition presents a signal-detection problem, inevitably 
producing false-positive and false-negative errors. Unrelated coresidents who refuse each other as 
sexual partners commit a false-positive error (they infer kinship in its absence). Genetic siblings 
who engage in incest commit a false-negative error (they fail to infer kinship in its presence). 
Assuming that it’s impossible to eliminate these kinds of errors, is there any reason to expect bias 
toward one type of error? 
 When engaging in scientific hypothesis testing, we are deliberately biased against false-
positive errors (i.e., inferring effects in their absence) because we find them to be more costly for 
science. Within biological organisms, natural selection can produce psychological mechanisms 
with biases against the type of error that is more costly in terms of reproductive fitness; thus, 
people tend to over-perceive dangers, and men tend to over-perceive sexual interest in women, as 
under-perception in these particular contexts is more costly (Haselton & Nettle, 2006). 
Conversely, people tend to under-perceive individuating characteristics of outgroup faces 
(Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992), and women tend to under-perceive men’s romantic commitment 
intentions, especially prior to the onset of sexual activity in relationships (Ackerman, 
Griskevicius, & Li, 2009). Assuming a degree of ambiguity regarding genetic relatedness, is it 
more costly to over-perceive or under-perceive kinship? 
 Within the contexts of sexual relations and altruism, respectively, the consequences of 
false-negative errors are incest and failing to provide aid to real kin, whereas the consequences of 
false-positive errors are refusing a genetically suitable mate and providing aid to nonkin. Whether 
a bias toward one type of error is more adaptive will clearly depend on several factors, such as 
the sheer number of close kin in one’s environment (Park et al., 2008). For instance, if most 
people you encounter happen to be kin (because you come from a big family in a small village), 
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the odds of committing false-positive errors are low, so it may be more adaptive to be biased 
toward such errors. 
 One important variable that may modulate these kin-recognition biases is one’s sex 
(Ackerman et al., 2007). Inbreeding is costly, but it is more costly for females than males (as any 
unfit reproduction is more costly for mammalian females; Trivers, 1972). So, women are 
expected to harbor a stronger bias toward false-positive errors (i.e., a tendency to infer kinship in 
its absence) in the context of sexual relations than men. Indeed, women do seem to find the 
prospect of incest more aversive than do men under some circumstances (Fessler & Navarrete, 
2004). More importantly, there should be a particularly large sex difference in aversion toward 
sex with close but unrelated individuals – instances in which women, but not men, 
(unconsciously) perceive the target as kin. Likewise, providing gratuitous aid to nonkin is costly 
(though admirable), but it may be relatively less costly for females than for males. Female nonkin 
relationships tend to be more communal than men’s, marked by tight connections and socio-
emotional bonds (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997; Geary & Flinn, 2002; Kashima et al., 1995), and 
the types of support provided in these relationships mirrors the altruism within families – given 
without strong expectation of reciprocity (Ackerman & Kenrick, 2008; Clark, Mills, & Powell, 
1986). There is also historical evidence to suggest that humans were ancestrally patrilocal (i.e., at 
marriage, women moved into men’s families and not the converse; Pasternak, Ember, & Ember, 
1997), which may have created pressure for women to form supportive social alliances by over-
perceiving kinship. In contrast, men’s nonkin relationships tend to be more hierarchical and task-
oriented, with support following a reciprocal, exchange-based format. Within such situations, 
women’s accidental altruism toward nonkin is likely to build social relationships, but men’s 
altruism is less likely to do so. In fact, male altruism may even upset established or anticipated 
social hierarchies (e.g., consider two men fighting over who will pay the dinner bill). This is not 
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to say that men never treat unrelated others like family, but simply that within the contexts of 
sexual or altruistic interaction, women are more likely to benefit from over-perceiving kinship. 
 
<h2>Psychological kinship 
 
 As reviewed above, it is not genetic relatedness per se that underlies kinship-relevant 
behavior; what matters is the extent to which a particular person is perceived as “kin” – what 
Lieberman et al. (2007) referred to as the kinship index. The perception of kinship encompasses 
propositional knowledge that a particular person is a sibling, cousin, etc.; familiarity that one 
feels with respect to those persons; and implicit detection of other kinship cues. So, even if a 
person is genetically unrelated to us, we may consciously categorize that person as kin (e.g., as a 
“sibling,” if there has been a history of coresidence) and/or we may experience cognitive and 
emotional reactions normally directed towards kin (such as dampened passion and heightened 
compassion) in interactions with this person. Wolf (1966) relates a girl’s reply when asked why 
she refused to marry a boy whose family she had joined as a child: “I just couldn’t do it. It was 
too embarrassing. Imagine marrying your brother!” (p. 893). Pinker (1997) referred to such 
erroneous perceptions as “kinship illusions.” More generally, the perception and experience of 
kinship – erroneous or not – has been referred to as “psychological kinship” (Bailey, 1988). 
 A handful of social psychological studies have attempted to investigate psychological 
kinship – that is, the specific cognitive and emotional mediators of kin-directed behavior 
(Korchmaros & Kenny, 2001; Kruger, 2003; Maner & Gailliot, 2007; Neyer & Lang, 2003; Park 
& Schaller, 2005). These have all focused on mediators of altruism, and they have revealed that 
emotional closeness – and more specifically empathic concern – may be among the key 
mediators. Cognitive mediators such as perceived self–other overlap have been shown to predict 
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helping behaviors as well (Maner et al., 2002). Park and Schaller (2005) found that, while an 
attitudinally similar stranger implicitly activates both “family” and “pleasant” concepts, only the 
former concept predicts desire to assist the target individual. Thus, one component of 
psychological kinship appears to be cognitive activation of family-related concepts, rather than 
activation of positive concepts more broadly. The cognitive processing of psychological kin may 
therefore recruit the same psychological mechanisms devoted to the processing of real kin 
(Ackerman et al., 2007; Park et al., 2008). 
 An important implication is that when a person experiences psychological kinship with 
someone else, even an unrelated person, this may trigger sexual aversion and/or altruistic 
behaviors. Of course, the experience of psychological kinship is not all-or-nothing, and people 
may sometimes actively ignore certain pieces of kin-connoting information; thus, reactions in the 
real world will likely comprise a mixture of thoughts and feelings at varying degrees of strength. 
For example, a woman who has a brother who looks uncannily like her, and with whom she has 
coresided, may experience a robustly high level of psychological kinship with him. On the other 
hand, a man who meets a woman who shares his attitudes and interests may experience a low 
level of psychological kinship, which may decrease to zero if he is romantically inclined towards 
her. Most instances of psychological kinship will fall within these extremes, thus emphasizing the 
importance of relationship context for modulating the perception of kinship. Below, we discuss 
some of these contexts, focusing our discussion explicitly on relationships and interactions 
between genetically unrelated individuals. Many of these have traditionally been studied as 
unique, independent relationship domains. Our perspective suggests instead that our 
understanding and treatment of people within a wide variety of relationships is influenced by 
mechanisms designed for the processing of kin, at least to a greater extent than we may 
recognize. 
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<h2>Friendship 
 
 We know that the key antecedents of psychological kinship are high levels of familiarity 
and perceived similarity, and that emotional closeness and empathy are key affective reactions. 
Are there nonkin relationships that are characterized by high familiarity, similarity, emotional 
closeness, and empathy? Yes: friendships. 
 Next to family members, friends seem to occupy an especially important place in most 
people’s social networks. In some ways, friendship connotes a level of closeness that even 
exceeds what is typically experienced between siblings, as revealed by the intelligible statement 
“my sister and I are so close, we are practically best friends.” (Of course, the blurring of 
relationship boundaries in the opposite direction occurs as well: “My friend and I are so close, 
we’re like sisters.”) As with kinship, the psychology of friendship seems to have received 
relatively little attention in social psychology (the same JPSP search returned 44 articles with 
“friend,” “friends,” or “friendship” in the title, representing 0.55% of the total; and only a subset 
of these articles appeared to be about friendship per se). What is friendship? How is it 
psychologically distinct from kinship? And under what circumstances might psychological 
kinship underlie friendship? 
 Objectively, kinship and friendship (among unrelated individuals) are different. Kin are 
genetically related; friends are not. With many kin, a large chunk of childhood is spent living in 
the same household; this is rarely the case for friends. Friends do not suffer genetic fitness costs 
from engaging in sexual activity. Altruism towards friends also nominally falls outside the 
domain of kin selection. By default, then, helping between friends would seem to be best 
explained by reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) – the other major theory of the evolution of 
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altruism, which explains the tendency to help as dependent on future opportunities to have that 
help repaid. On the surface this seems sensible, as friendship does involve give and take. 
However, theory and research in the social sciences – as well as our intuitions regarding 
friendship – tell a different story. 
 A common categorization of human relationships distinguishes between communal and 
exchange relationships (e.g., Clark & Mills, 1979; Fiske, 1992). Communal relationships are 
defined in part by a tendency for individuals to provide assistance to each other largely 
unconditionally; exchange relationships, on the other hand, are defined by the norms of reciprocal 
exchange. Interestingly, early theorists simply assumed that both friends and family fall within 
the communal category. More importantly, research has shown that friendship does indeed follow 
the communal pattern (Clark, Mills, & Corcoran, 1989), implying that people think of friendships 
as relationships that should not be governed explicitly by reciprocal exchange (see also Stewart-
Williams, 2007). Indeed, a good way to nip a budding friendship is to return favors blatantly or to 
refuse them in the first place. Such considerations suggest a commonality between kinship and 
friendship. However, there are important differences as well. For example, people preferentially 
give help to kin or to friends under different circumstances. People provide more low-cost help to 
friends than to siblings, but more high-cost help to siblings than to friends (Stewart-Williams, 
2007). Evidence also suggests that people prefer providing instrumental support to kin and 
emotional support to friends (Felton & Berry, 1992; Taylor & Chatters, 1986). Furthermore, 
despite similarities in the communal nature of the relationships, kinships may be more 
impervious to relationship threats. Even in those cases where friends psychologically feel like 
kin, a long-term lack of reciprocity can lead to the dissolution of friendships (Ackerman & 
Kenrick, 2008; Argyle & Henderson, 1984). Kinship, on the other hand, is for life. 
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 These considerations suggest that friendship is conceptually distinct from other 
relationships, that altruism towards friends is fully explained by neither kin selection nor 
reciprocal altruism. Indeed, evolutionary psychologists have proposed that friendship develops 
via alternative routes, such as positive feedback of mutual valuation (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996) 
and alliance formation (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009). From the present perspective, one theoretical 
possibility is that friendships develop along a rather independent trajectory from that of kinships, 
but over time adopt many of the same psychological mechanisms. For instance, many newly 
formed alliances involve heightened sensitivity to reciprocal exchange and the overall equality 
that is maintained in the relationship (e.g., Clark & Mills, 1979). Over time, reciprocity becomes 
less important and communal (familial) feelings grow (Lydon, Jamieson, & Holmes, 1997). The 
costs of false-positive kinship-perception errors also drop as friendships develop (e.g., the risks of 
being cheated are lower within more established friendships). Thus, in many situations, and for 
many people, friends may become psychological kin. 
 Recent research reveals that the tendency to experience friendship as being akin to kinship 
may be more pronounced for some people than for others. We considered above why women 
might be more inclined to treat unrelated others as family members (i.e., because of the norms of 
female relationships, the higher costs of inbreeding, and ancestral patrilocality). Importantly, this 
does not mean women should treat all others as kin. The potential costs of responding to 
unfamiliar people as though they were family – from physical and economic harm to the loss of 
mating opportunities – can be quite high. Friends, however, represent an ideal combination of 
closeness and familiarity to encourage signal-detection errors among women. 
 Ackerman and colleagues tested this idea in several studies that examined emotional and 
behavioral reactions to three types of relationships – siblings, friends, and strangers. Two studies 
asked men and women to imagine either kissing (Study 1) or having sex with (Study 2) an 
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opposite-sex person from one of the three relationship categories, and then to indicate the extent 
of various emotions they felt while imagining these scenarios (Study 2 is reported in Ackerman et 
al., 2007). Both studies revealed similar patterns (though kissing did not elicit as strongly 
negative or positive reactions as did sex). The thought of making out or having sex with a sibling 
was quite upsetting for most people: Men and women reported high levels of disgust and low 
levels of positive affect. The opposite was true for imagined strangers: Emotional responses were 
uniformly positive (presumably these were not undesirable imaginary strangers). However, 
reactions to friends were more complex: Men were as positive to romance with friends as they 
were to romance with strangers; women, on the other hand, were more negative to romantic 
thoughts about friends, and they felt especially strong disgust, an emotion tied to sexual aversion 
(e.g., Lieberman et al., 2007; Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009). Consistent with this 
finding, in a study conducted by Park (2008), women reported greater disgust than did men when 
instructed to imagine having sex with a close friend, whereas men and women reported equally 
high levels of disgust when instructed to imagine having sex with close kin. 
 In another study, Ackerman et al. (2007) investigated the role of biological sex and 
relationship type on altruistic behavior. Here, people took part in an online quiz task in which 
they worked on logic questions in two-person team environments consisting of real kin (parents, 
children, and siblings), friends, and strangers. Each person attempted to complete as many 
questions as possible within a limited time. At the end, the total team score was calculated and 
provided to the participants (no individual performance feedback was given). Unbeknownst to 
participants, every team received the same score: 93% correct. Each person then judged which 
team member was most responsible for the outcome. As in the earlier studies, women and men 
responded identically within the kin and stranger pairings: Everyone gave credit to their family 
members and took credit from strangers. Thus, people were more altruistic with family than with 
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unrelated others. However, with friends, judgments again diverged. Men treated their friends like 
strangers, taking credit for the successful outcome. Women treated their friends like kin, giving 
credit for success to their friends. These patterns indicate more than people simply being nicer to 
women than to men; the team partners were an equal mix of men and women in all conditions. 
Instead, a cogent explanation is that women treated their friends more like family members than 
did men, both in sexual and altruistic contexts. 
 These studies are consistent with the idea that women use psychological mechanisms 
associated with kinship to process friendship, at least more so than do men, but they also raise a 
number of intriguing questions. For instance, how might kin-relevant psychological mechanisms 
be activated? One possibility is that some implicit process is triggered during friendship 
formation, akin to a critical period in which friends are imprinted into women’s kinship networks. 
Another possibility is that the cognitive and behavioral strategies women use when interacting 
with friends exploit kinship indicators such as familiarity and similarity. We have already 
mentioned female-biased interaction norms of cooperation and socio-emotional connection. 
Other behaviors, such as mutual grooming and dressing alike, may also produce familial feelings. 
Finally, such norms and behaviors may facilitate cognitively taking the perspective of friends, an 
ability more indicative of biological than nonbiological relationships. If so, this might suggest 
that psychological kinship can be elicited through repeatedly simulating the mental perspective of 
others. These types of mechanisms are relevant to men as well, of course, but may be activated 
primarily under specific conditions. One of these specific conditions may be the presence of 
intergroup competition. 
 
<h2>Intergroup competition and male bonding 
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 Why might intergroup competition lead men to treat their friends as though they were 
kin? Competition between individuals and groups, from families to teams to nations, is a central 
feature of humans’ evolutionary history (Ackerman & Kenrick, 2008; Baumeister & Leary, 
1995). The potential for social conflict may in fact be the primary motivator of non-genetic, non-
romantic social bonding. However, across societies and primate species, one subset of individuals 
participates in and is responsive to intergroup conflict more than any other – males. In humans, 
men have historically been the soldiers in warfare and the players in team sports. This is not 
simply because men are more aggressive than are women. The mere suggestion of competition 
between groups triggers ingroup male-bonding mechanisms. For example, telling people that 
researchers are studying the relative performance of groups leads male members of those groups, 
but not female members, to engage in costly ingroup cooperation (Van Vugt, De Cremer, & 
Janssen, 2007). In fact, this relatively minor intergroup threat also increases men’s identification 
with their ingroup. Van Vugt and colleagues (2007; Van Vugt & Park, 2010) have proposed that 
such findings, and those from studies in many other cultures (e.g., Chagnon, 1988; Keegan, 
1994), are evidence for a male warrior hypothesis. This hypothesis states that the behaviors and 
cognitions of men are more oriented toward between-group interactions than are those of women. 
The reason for this sex difference is that men stand to gain relatively more status and 
reproductive benefits through group-level competition. 
 The presence of intergroup threat thus motivates both ingroup solidarity and, potentially, 
improved ingroup performance. Sports teams may excel and gain fervent fan followings by 
emphasizing competition with close rivals, and the same is true for religious sects, nations, and 
even newly formed “minimal” groups (Ackerman, Shapiro, & Maner, in press; Campbell, 1965; 
Hammond & Axelrod, 2006; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). Male bonding is 
especially likely to increase as a result of outgroup-threat signals. Under such conditions, men 
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may begin to over-perceive kinship among their friends and associates. If so, this suggests that 
intergroup competition will lead men not only to behave more altruistically toward their friends, 
but also to respond less positively toward suggestions of romantic relations with opposite-sex 
friends. Anecdotal and experimental evidence supports the former possibility (e.g., self-sacrificial 
behavior to save fellow soldiers during wartime; also see the above citations), though less is 
known about the latter possibility. Although designed to test somewhat different hypotheses, 
Ackerman and Kenrick (2009) conducted a series of studies on intragroup and intergroup 
romance that have implications both for altruistic behavior and for the prospect of decreased male 
attraction toward female friends. 
 “The Mating Game” refers to the social and competitive process of forming romantic 
relationships. People playing this game (i.e., attempting to attract a mate) must navigate murky 
romantic waters by convincing potential mates that they are desirable selections and by besting 
competitors for those mates. Therefore, for heterosexual individuals, romantic relationship 
formation involves a game of “intergroup competition” between men and women. Sometimes, 
though, this mating game is a team sport. That is, people may help each other to find, evaluate, 
and attract romantic partners. Historically, and at present in many cultures, these “teammates” 
consist of family members (see Kenrick & Keefe, 1992; Park, Dubbs, & Buunk, 2009). For 
example, parents or other kin may broker the selection of marriage partners (Apostolou, 2007), or 
people may simply try to influence the mating behavior of their relatives (Faulkner & Schaller, 
2007). In relatively more mobile, Western cultures, friends may act as psychological kin for 
similar purposes. 
 In a series of studies investigating cooperative courtship behaviors, Ackerman and 
Kenrick (2009) tested the possibility that friends would help each other to achieve romantic 
goals. The studies revealed that men and women in the U.S. did help their friends in ways akin to 
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the help given by kin in other cultures. For instance, in many such societies (especially 
polygynous ones), it is the woman’s family which attempts to negotiate a high threshold for a 
husband, whereas the man relies on his family to help pay an adequate bride-price (Anderson, 
2007; Geary & Flinn, 2001). This pattern is indicative of differing romantic motivations that 
males and females hold as a result of evolved parental investment pressures. That is, the 
relatively higher potential costs borne by females from investing in offspring (e.g., pregnancy) 
lead women to be more romantically choosy than men. Thus, women are more likely to set up 
romantic thresholds for men to overcome by demonstrating their quality as a mate. Indeed, the 
studies showed that women were more likely to help each other build barriers to unwanted 
romance and even test the value of desirable males, whereas men were more likely to help each 
other break down those barriers (Ackerman & Kenrick, 2009). Interestingly, opposite-sex friends 
adjusted the type of help they gave in order to meet their friends’ romantic goals. People even 
used counterfeit romantic partners to build and break down barriers. These behaviors carry high 
potential costs (e.g., helpers may “cheat” by attempting to attract a desirable target rather than aid 
a friend), and thus only people who share a high degree of trust and common fate make good 
teammates. We propose that the use of friends in these situations may signal that these friends 
feel a sense of psychological kinship. Further, the aid given by opposite-sex friends (e.g., women 
helping men attract other women, men helping women to block other men) may also suggest that 
these friends feel decreased romantic attraction towards each other. Regardless, the results of 
these studies indicate that both women and men can interact with friends much as they do kin. 
Women may generally be more likely to do so, but in the context of intergroup competition, 
men’s friends may become more like family. 
 
<h2>The use and misuse of kinship terms 
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 The impact of psychological kinship may also be felt in our linguistic interactions. The 
wide array of terms used to identify kin highlights the importance of formally establishing rules 
of social relations and genetic heritage among family members. Kin can be distinguished by 
gender, lineage, degree of genetic overlap, and marriage, all to a fine degree. Contrast this with 
the far more imprecise identification of “friends.” Here, if a qualification is made, it is usually 
limited to “friends” versus “best friends.” An alternative way of identifying the closeness felt 
with such unrelated others is through the over-application of kinship terminology. 
 People use kin terms to regulate social connections within a number of nonbiological 
relationships. Among friends, people might refer to “blood brothers” or “blood sisters,” or label 
someone “a member of my family.” Through marriage, people may become step-siblings or 
cousins-in-law. Close friends of one’s parents might become “aunts,” “uncles,” or even 
“godparents.” Similar terminology is used within groups that share some common interest or 
distinguishing characteristic. Student coalitions like sororities and fraternities allow “sisters” and 
“brothers” to bond through shared activities and communal living. Social groups bound by race 
or ethnicity may adopt these terms as well. Businesses may label themselves “happy families,” 
even when their employees are unrelated. Organized criminal gangs, such as the Mafia or 
Yakuza, also profit from familial labels. Even nonhumans can benefit from the use of kinship 
terminology. Pets become “members of the family,” and many religions construe deities as 
“father- and mother-figures” (and the members as “children”). In fact, there is evidence that 
political speech is especially evocative when it employs these sorts of kin terms (Johnson, 
Ratwik, & Sawyer, 1987; Salmon, 1998). 
 This broad application of kin terms can help to ensure that the same benefits provided to 
genetic relatives can spread to unrelated others. Simulated relatedness promotes the exchange of 
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social support and encourages socialization within communities (Chatters, Taylor, & Jayakody, 
1994). Fictive kinship can also kick start engagement in reciprocal relationships (e.g., Chatters et 
al., 1994). These relationships tend to involve more lenient reciprocation schedules than 
relationships with explicitly unrelated individuals, and thus overall cooperativeness is increased. 
Research suggests that those people who lack close kin and other sources of support may be most 
likely to form false familial relationships (MacRae, 1992). Interestingly, fictive kinship may 
sometimes be the result of donated social support, and not the elicitor of it (e.g., Karner, 1998). 
 
<h1>Conclusions and future directions 
 
 In this chapter, we highlighted two major points about kin relations within and beyond the 
family. First, to understand kinship-relevant behavior, we must rigorously identify the underlying 
psychological mechanisms. Behavior cannot be simply assumed to follow normative, biologically 
derived expectations, because organisms have not necessarily evolved to accurately calculate 
genetic relatedness between themselves and others and to behave accordingly. What seem to have 
evolved are psychological heuristics, which promote adaptive behavior but are not immune to 
“kinship illusions.” The second important point is that the psychological processes underlying kin 
relations may exert influences within other social relationships; moreover, based on evolutionary 
cost–benefit analysis, we can predict when people’s kinship psychology may be especially likely 
to be over-applied. We reviewed research showing that across both sexual and altruistic contexts, 
women are especially likely to treat their friends as though they were kin. As we discussed above, 
however, men may treat their friends (or other close individuals) as though they were kin within 
the context of intergroup conflict. 
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 Although our analysis of friendship does suggest that friendship is sometimes akin to 
kinship, we do not rule out the possibility that people possess distinct psychological mechanisms 
to process friendship. We are thus left with several important questions. To what extent do the 
observed effects (e.g., women reacting to friends as though they were kin) indicate activation of 
kin-processing psychological mechanisms? How distinct are the psychological mechanisms 
underlying kinship and friendship? More broadly, to what extent are kin- and other relationship-
processing mechanism domain specific? 
 These kinds of questions are not merely academic. Research on the psychology of kin 
relations is being closely followed by legal scholars, who in turn are publishing writings that 
could potentially influence policy in areas such as foster care and adoption (e.g., Herring, 2003, 
2009). Thus, another area for future research concerns applying knowledge of kinship 
psychology towards maximizing high-quality care among children placed in foster or adoptive 
care. Is a child better off when placed with parents whom the child physically resembles? If so, is 
it especially important for the child to resemble male parents? More broadly, how might the 
psychology of kinship influence people’s subjective definition of kinship? In custody battles 
involving biological and adoptive parents, might some people be more inclined towards 
perceiving that the adoptive parents (with their high level of familiarity) are the “real parents”? 
People’s definitions of and reactions to incest might also be influenced by these psychological 
mechanisms. Such questions demonstrate the fundamental and practical importance of expanding 
our knowledge base on issues of kin relations, both within and beyond the family. We have 
barely scratched the surface on such matters. 
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